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TAXES, INSURANCE, AND CORPORATE PENSION POLICY
by Andrew H. Chen
ABSTRACT

The passage of ERISA in 1974 has significant impact on corporate
pension plans in the U.S.

In this paper, the special tax treatment and

regulation of the defined-benefit private pension plans under ERISA are
discussed, and the joint effects of taxation and insurance on corporate
pension policies are analyzed.
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Taxes, Insurance, and Corporate Pension Policy

I.

Introduction
Since the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)

in 1974, considerable attention has been given to the study and development
of optimal strategies for corporate pension management.

The pension liabilities

have now become parts of corporate liabilities under ERISA, therefore, the
management of corporate pension plans has become an integral part of corporate
management of financial managers.

The corporate pensions are subject to special

tax treatments in the Internal Revenue Code and are subject to various regulations
under ERISA.

Therefore, it is very important to analyze and understand the

-

complex trade-offs among various explicit and implicit benefits and costs before
some useful strategy recommendations can be suggested for corporate pension
management.

Without a comprehensive analysis of these complex trade-offs, any

policy recommendations could be biased and nonoptimal.
Several important contributions in the area of corporate pension management
have been developed in finance literature and some specific recommendations on
corporate pension policies have been derived.

For instance, Sharpe (1976] has

shown that in the absence of taxes and under the current structure of a fixed
insurance premium charged by the PBGC, the "insurance effect" calls for an
optimal policy with a minimum plan funding and a maximum investment in
risky assets.

On the other hand, Black (1980] and Tepper [1981], have argued

that in the absence of default risk and pension insurance, the "tax effect"
calls for a maximum plan funding and investing the pension fund totally in
highly taxed assets such as bonds.

Although these analyses have greatly
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enhanced our understanding of the major problems and issues associated with
corporat,e pension plans, their antipodal recommendations on pension policies
are based upon partial and incomplete analyses, and hence are not generally
acceptable •.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the complex features of taxes
and regulation on corporate pension plans in the

u.s.

labor market.

The

pension assets and pension liabilities are integrated into corporate assets
and corporate liabilities for the purpose of examining changes in the
ownership rights of claims to assets caused by the enactment of ERISA.
Contingent-claim analysis is used to determine the economic value of
pension claims and to study the implications of ERISA on corporate pension
policies.
The paper is organized as follows.

In Section II, the tax provisions

as well as the major provisions of ERISA for corporate pension plans are
described.

Section III uses the augmented balance sheet of General Motors

to illustrate the importance of pension assets and liabilities in the
corporate financial structure.

The tax effects on corporate pension policies

derived in the previous studies are summarized in Section IV.

In Section V,

we employ contingent-claim analysis to determine the economic value of the
pension claims before and after ERISA.

Some general properties about the

value of pension claims are also described.
policies are described in Section VI.
insurance are discussed in Section VII.
summary of the study.

The insurance effects on pension

The joint implications of taxes and
The final section contains a brief
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II.

Taxes and Regulations On Corporate Pension
A.

Tax Provisions For Corporate Pension
It is well recognized that the special tax status of corporate

pension plans is one of the major factors that a firm offers pensions to
its employees.!!

Therefore, it is useful for us to briefly summarize the

major tax provisions for the qualified
.
t h e ~mpact
of

clarify

.

taxat~on

pension plans in order to

on t h e corporate

.

pens~on

2/
.
po 1"~c~es.-

The

major tax provisions for the qualified pension plans, as specified in the
Internal Revenue Act of 1942, include,
1.

An

employer's contribution to a pension plan on behalf of an employee

is not taxable as income to the employee until it is realized as a
pension payment.
2.

Thus, it is a tax deferral for the employee.

The investment income of a pension plan is tax exempt.

Therefore,

this provision constitutes a tax deferral for the employee because
the investment income is not taxed until it is distributed and
realized as pension income.
3.

The employer's contributions to a pension plan are immediately
deductible from business income.

In addition to these three broad tax provisions, the special tax treatment
of the Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) should be noted.
ERISA allowed anyone who is

~

The provisions in

a participant in a qualified pension plan to set

up an IRA and make contributions up to $1,500 a year that are excludable from
the current taxable income until it is distributed from an IRA.

Furthermore, the

investment income earned by an IRA is not taxed until it is distributed.

The

special tax treatment of the IRAs was recently liberalized in The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981.

The 1981 Tax Act has made IRAs available to everyone

and increased the maximum excludable contributions

to

$2,000 a year.
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Finally, there are other tax provisions that are relevant in the discussions
of tax effects on corporate pension plans.
1.

These relevant tax provisions are:

The corporate pension accruals are not counted as part of the payroll
tax base.

2.

The corporate pension accruals are not credited to the social
security benefit base.

3.

The social security benefits are tax exempt.

Therefore, contrary to the argument that a pension plan and an IRA are
equivalent in providing tax shelter, we know that a pension plan provides a
3/ When an employee
shelter from payroll
taxes that an IRA does not.receives
a deferred benefit such as pension accrual rather than an equivalent amount of
wages, both the employee and the employer avoid their share of the payroll taxes
on the wages.
B.

Thus, there is a net tax advantage provided by a

pens~on

plan.

Major Provisions Of ERISA

The enactment of ERISA in 1974 has greatly changed the corporate pension
system in the U.

s.

The defined benefit pension plans are now regulated by the

provisions of ERISA that include the establishment of the benefit insurance
program and rules on pension coverage and minimum vesting and funding standards.~
Some of the major provisions will be reviewed in the following.
1.

ERISA established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)

within the Department of Labor.

The PBGC is a

quasi~ governmental

agency which

insures and regulates pension plans~ The premiums for the pension benefit insurance
are currently $2.60 per employee per year and are paid by the employers or the
pension plans.
The Guaranty Corporati on was empowered by ERISA to monitor corporate pension
p l ans, and if necessary to terminate a pension plan.

A corporate pension plan
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can be terminated due to any of the following reasons:
(1) if it has failed to meet the minimum funding requirement;
(2) if it is unable to pay benefits when due;
(3) if it has been administered improperly; or
(4) if its continuation is likely to increase the Guaranty Corporation's
liabilities unreasonably.
ERISA also specified that if a pension plan were terminated for any of
the above reasons, the Guaranty Corporation had the power to place a lien on
6/
the sponsoring firm's assets up to 30 percent of the company's net worth.This lien would be senior to all unsecured liabilities of the company except
wages.
2.

ERISA imposed some minimum funding standards.

Prior to ERISA, pension

plans only had to comply with IRS standards in order to be qualified.

The IRS

standards required that the current accruals and the interest on the unfunded
liabilities be funded.

ERISA required that pension liabilities due to past

service must be amortized over a period not exceeding 40 years for existing
plans and 30 years for new plans.

In addition, any increased liabilities

which arise with a liberalization of pension benefits must be amortized over
30 years.
A pension plan must be examined by an actuary at least once every three
years, and any experienced gains orlosses which arise from the actuary examination
must be amortized over a 15-year period.

Failure to meet these funding standards

would make the company subject to a 5 percent nondeductible penalty tax, and if
the funding deficiency was not corrected in 90 days an additional nondeductible
penalty tax equal to 100 percent of the deficiency would be assessed.
3.

ERISA imposed fiduciary responsibility for pension plan administrators.

6.

The pension plan managers are required to act solely in the interest of plan
participants, and they could be liable for losses that result from any violation
of the "prudent man " rule.

ERISA also imposed rules on reporting and disclosure.

It mandated plan audits, actuarial evaluations, and an itemized listing of pension
assets.

It also required that certain types of information be given directly

to the plan participants.
Therefore, the above provisions of taxes and insurance regulation indicate
that ERISA has maintained the tax advantage for employers to provide pension
plans and made pension benefits more certain for plan beneficiaries.

A more

certain pension benefit means a lower cost for firms to provide the deferred
compensations.

Under ERISA, firms have gained this benefit of lower cost of

providing the deferred compensations by paying an explicit price of nominal
fees for insurance and an implicit price of subjecting themselves to some
regulatory taxes imposed by the Guaranty Corporation.
III.

Importance of Pension Plans In Corporate Financial Structure
The change in the legal status of pension liabilities under ERISA and

the rapid growth of pension plans in the postwar period have made pension plans
the major component of corporate financial structure.
liabilities were not liabilities of the firm.

Prior to ERISA, pension

Upon the termination of a pension

plan, the beneficiaries only had the legal claims on the assets of the pension
fund; if pension funds were not sufficient to cover the accrued liabilities,
the beneficiaries of the plan would not have recourse to the general assets
of the company.

However, the pension liabilities have now become parts of

corporate liabilities under ERISA, and the management of corporate pension
plans has become an integral part of corporate management of financial
managers.
The rapid growth of pension plans have made pension assets and pension
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liabilities the important components of financial structure of large
corporations.

A recent survey of 470 of the Fortune 500 companies showed

that these companies incurred $21.5 billion in pension costs in 1980, which
was about 12.6 percent of pretax profits and 8.1 percent of wages and salaries.Zf
The pension assets for these companies amounted to about 13 percent of total
corporate assets and about 31 percent of net worth.

On the liabilities side,

the companies had accumulated about $151 billion of vested pension liabilities,
which was about 24 percent of outstanding corporate liabilities for these
companies.
To see the importance of pension plans in corporate financial structure
of a firm, we have constructed an augmented balance sheet for General Motors
(GM) as of the end of 1982 in Figure 1 below.

At the end of 1982 GM had an

actuarial present value of plan benefits obligation of $18.1 billion.
pension assets of about $14.4 billion, the company had
liabilities of $3.7 billion.

With

"unfunded" pe!lsion

The pension assets of the company amounted to

about 25.8 percent of its total corporate assets.

GM's unfunded pension

liabilities at the end of 1982 amounted to about 25.5 percent of the company's
net worth in book value.

Moreover, the pension liabilities of GM at the end

of 1982 were about 41.3 percent of its outstanding corporate liabilities and
were about four times of its book value of long-term debt.

Therefore, the

presence of such a large amount of pension liabilities for the company can
not be ignored by the workers, shareholders, creditors and managers of the
company.

The management of pension plans should be an important part of

financial management decisions and should be of great concern to the financial
managers of the major corporations.

8.

Figure 1.
General Motors
Augmented Balance Sheet
December 31, 1982
(all figures in billions of dollars)
Assets

Liabilities and Common Equity

Pension Fund Assets

14.4

Pension Liabilities

Plant and Equipment

21.5

Long-Term Debt

Other Long-Term Assets
Current Assets

5.9
14.0

4.5
14.5

Equity
Other Long-Term
Liabilities

6.3

Current Liabilities
55.8

IV.

Tax Effects

On

18.1

12.4
55.8

Pension Policy

As mentioned earlier, corporate pension plans have two major tax provisions:
(1) the employers' contributions to the pension funds are deductible immediately
for tax purpose; and (2) the earnings in the pension funds are not taxed. The
special tax status of corporate pension plans is an important factor for firms
to offer pension plans to their employees.

Furthermore, the special tax

treatment of pension plans provides the important influence on corporate
pension policies, that include (1) funding policy

deciding the level of

funding the pension funds; and (2) investment policy -- deciding the optimal
composition of pension fund assets.
Two important recent papers, by Black [1980] and Tepper [1981], have
studied the effects of taxation on corporate pension policies.

Black has
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argued that a firm maximizing shareholder wealth should employ the extreme
strategies in pension policy to capture the tax advantage under the current
tax laws, namely funding the pension with debt issue to the greatest possible
extent and investing the entire pension fund in bonds.

His plan calls for

a change from stocks to bonds in the pension fund and a change from stock to
bonds in the firm's capital structure.

Black's arguments for the extreme

pension policies are based upon the "debt capacity" model.Y

Essentially,

he argues that shifting from stocks to bonds in the pension fund will increase
the firm's debt capacity or borrowing power, which in turn can be utilized
to obtain additional tax subsidies through larger corporate leverage.
Tepper's study of the impact of taxes on optimal corporate pension
policy was based upon Miller's [1977] model of capital market equilibrium
in the presence of corporate as well as personal taxes under certainty.

He

argues that a firm should fully fund its pension plans to capture the
advantage of tax-deductibility of pension contribution and that the entire
pension fund should be invested in bonds to earn the pre-tax interest rates.
Thus, Tepper has derived similar recommendations on optimal pension policy
based upon a different model of capital market equilibrium.

It should be

noted that Tepper has argued, based upon Miller's invariance proposition
of corporate leverage, that the sources of funding a pension plan are of
no significant importance, a result which is different from that of Black's
debt capacity model.

Of course, if one allows the costs of tax avoidance

to be present in Miller's equilibrium, as Barnea

~

al [1981] have done,

then the sources of funding a firm's pension plans will be of importance
and a firm's total liabilities (both pension and corporate liabilities)
will be uniquely determined.

It should be noted that Black's and Tepper's extreme recommendations
on optimal pension policy are based on the "tax effect" alone.

They have not
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considered the pension default risk and the pension insurance mandated under
ERISA.

As we shall see later in this paper, an analysis of corporate pension

policy without incorporating the "insurance effect" is not complete, and any
policy recommendations result from such a partial analysis could be misleading.
Furthermore, an extreme investment policy of holding bonds only in a pension
fund will limit the fund's ability to hedge against unanticipated inflation
in the economy.

V.

Value of Pension Claims
To fully understand the financial implications of ERISA on corporate

pension plans, it is important to know the economic values of claims on a
pension plan before and after the passage of ERISA.
and Treynor

~

Following Sharpe [1976]

.!!_. [1976], we shall apply contingent-claim analysis to discuss

the economic values of pension claims before and after ERISA and examine the
changes of ownership rights to the claims of the assets of defined-benefit
pension plans.
A.

Pre-ERISA
Before ERISA a pension beneficiary's legal claim was

against the pension fund and not the assets of the sponsoring company.

It

was similar to but not the same as a conventional lender's claim, because a
pension beneficiary could not force the company into bankruptcy or liquidation.
Applying the simple contingent-claim analysis, the claim of pension beneficiaries
at the end of the year can be expressed as
PC(T) =min [ PA(T), B(T) ],

(1)

where,
PC(T) = economic value of pension claim at the end of the year;
PA(T) = market value of pension assets at the end of the year;
B(T) = vested pension liability at the end of the year.
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The pension claim can be viewed in two equivalent ways: (1) the pension
fund "owned" the pension assets and had the right to "put" them to the pension
beneficiaries in satisfaction of their claim against the pension fund; or (2)
the pension beneficiaries "owned" the assets in the pension fund, but the
pension managers had the option to "call" the assets in return for paying off
the vested pension liability.

Therefore, the option pricing formula of Black

and Scholes [1973] can be used to determine the economic value of a pension
claim.

The expression for pension claim in Equation (1) can be written as
PC(T) =min [ PA(T), B(T) ]
= B(T) -max [ B(T) - PA(T), 0 ].

(2)

Therefore, the current value of a pension claim, PC, can be expressed
in the following equation:
(3)

PC
where,
PC = current value of pension claim;

B = present value of the vested pension benefit, discounted
at the riskless interest rate; the contractual value;
P( ) =put option with relevant parameters in parentheses;
PA = current value of pension assets;

a2

= variance rate of return on the pension assets.

Viewing the pension claim in this way, the economic value of any pension
claim can be shown to consist of two elements, each of which can be analyzed
in terms of the financial theory: (1) the "contractual" value of the pension
claim, that is the present value of pension claim, discounted at the riskless
interest rate; and (2) the so-called "pension put" on the assets in the pension
iund, with an exercise price equal to the vested pension benefit at the end
of the year, B(T).
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From Black and Scholes' option pricing formula, we know that the
expression for the pension put is

P(PA, B(T), <T 2 )

=

-PA•N

+

B·N

rln
fln

(PA/B(T)) - (r

a-2

+

o-JT
(PA/B(T)) - (r -

z)T

)

~·)T}
(4)

a-jT

where,
N(.)
r

= the
= the

cumulative standard normal distribution;
riskless rate of interest.

Some general characteristics of a pension put are as follows:

a

p

.dPA

4

p

3 B(T)
'(Jp

acr.a

<

0

(Sa)

>

0

(Sb)

>

0

(Sc)

Therefore, we know the following results:
~PC

~

PA

~PC

'J B(T)
~PC

'(J

a-~

>

0

(6a)

>

0

(6b)

~

0

(6c)
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The above results indicate that the value of pension beneficiaries'
claim increases if either the value of the pension assets or the vested
pension benefit increases; the value of pension claim decreases if the risk
of pension assets increases.

Figure 2 shows how the value of a pension

claim is related to the pension put and the assets in the pension fund.

As

the pension claim approaches its due date (which is the same event as the
pension put approaching its expiration date) the value of the claim net of
the pension put approaches the kinked line shown in the figure.

On the other

hand, the longer until the pension claim falls due (which is the same event
as the pension put having longer time to the expiration), the more gradual
will be the option curve for the pension put and therefore the less the
pension claim net of the pension put will be worth for any given value of
the pension assets.

/

Value of
pension claim

/

/

/
/
/
/

/
;

;

/

(

Contractual value of pension claim

------------,-~----------------------------

T

Net value of pension claim

Pension assets

Figure 2.

Value of Pension Put and Pension Claim
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B.

Post-ERISA
As

we have discussed earlier, ERISA established PBGC which monitors

corporate pension plans and insures pension benefits for beneficiaries.
Furthermore, the PBGC has the power to place a lien on the company's assets
up to 30 percent of its net worth if a pension plan were terminated for
the reasons specified in ERISA.

In other words, the PBGC has exchanged a

certain claim against itself with a complex option against the company from
the pension beneficiaries.

This change of ownership rights of claims to the

assets of the firm has significant impact on pension policies as well as
other corporate financial management policies.

The pension claim of the PBGC at the end of the year can be expressed as
follows:
PPC(T) =min [ PA(T) +max ( .3( CA(T) - F(T)), 0), B(T) ]
where,

('l)

PPC(T) = the PBGC's pension claim at the end of the year;
CA(T) = value of corporate assets at the end of the year;
F(T) =the face value of corporate liability (unsecured debt).

The pension claim of the PBGC in Equation (7) is a complex option, and
its value can be determined using the option pricing technique.:!

To

clarify the general characteristics of this complex option, let us define
an asset H which pays nothing until the end of the year T and pays
PA(T) +max (.3(CA(T) - F(T)), 0) at timeT.
value of asset H, and

C(CA, F(T))

Let H( PA, CA, F) be the current

be the current value of a European call

option on the corporate assets, CA, with an exercise price F(T).

Then, we can

see that:
H(PA, CA, F)

=

PA +

~3C(CA,

F(T))

(8)
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In other words, the current value of asset H is equal to the sum of the current
value of the pension assets and 30 percent of a call option on corporate assets
with exercise price equal to the face value of the unsecured debt of the
company.

With these results, we can express the pension claim of the PBGC as

a function of the value of asset H:
PPC (T)

= min

[ H(T) , B(T) ] •

(9)

Therefore, the present value of the PBGC's pension claim can be expressed

as follows:

=B-

PPC

P (H, B(T))

(10)

Equation(lO) shows that the value of the PBGC's claim is equal to the
contractual value of pension claim (i.e., the present value of vested
pension liabilities, discounted at the riskless interest rate) minus the
value of a put option on asset H.

Some of the general properties of the

PBGC's claim can be obtained using the known properties of simple put and
call options.

Let the current value of the pension claim of the PBGC

be PPC(PA, CA, B(T), F(T)),

(3PPC

-1)PA

=

~PPC

we know the following results :

-P aH
H~PA

>

'aH
-PH3CA

>O

0

(Ua)

8CA

=

3PPC

= e-rT-~
;>o
3B(T)

(llc)

= _p 3 H

(lld)

~B(T)

~PPC

--aF(T)

H 3F (T)

<

(llb)

0

16,

<. o!..OI

(lle)

where i?cp is the correlation coefficient between returns on
CA and PA.
The above results indicate that the value of the pension claim increases if the
value of the pension assets or the value of the corporate assets increases.

The

value of the pension claim also increases if the vested pension liabilities
increase., but it decreases if the face value of the unsecured debt of the
company increases, because a higher face value for corporate debt implies a
decrease in the net worth value for the PBGC.
As shown in Equation (3), the value of the participant s' pension claim
pre-ERISA is equivalent to a certain claim on the vested pension benefit
combined with a short position in a pension put on the pension assets; while
as shown in Equation (10), the post-ERISA value of the PBGC's pension claim
is equivalent to a certain claim on the vested pension benefit combined with
a short position in a pension put on asset H.

Therefore, the post-ERISA value

of the pension claim has increased from the pre-ERISA value by 30 percent of
the value of a call option on the corporate assets with exercise price equal
to the face value of the unsecured debt.
the cost of this difference.

An interesting question is who bears

Since the Guaranty Corporation has been charging

a fixed insurance premium on all defined-ben efit pension plans, it can be seen
that shareholder s of the firms with unfunded pension plans gained at the
expense of those with fully funded pension plans.

How much welfare loss the

shareholder s of the firms with fully funded pension plans had experienced from
the passage of ERISA is an interesting empirical question.!2 /
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VI. Insurance Effects on Pension Policy
Sharpe [1976] has shown that in the absence of taxes and given the current
structure of a fixed insurance premium charged by the PBGC, the "insurance effect"
calls for an optimal pension policy that involves with a minimum funding and
investing more of the pension funds in the risky assets to maximize the default
risk.

It should be pointed out that Sharpe's analysis of pension claim based

upon the option pricing model is closer to the situation before ERISA, because
he uses the pension assets, and not the combined corporate and pension assets,
as the underlying assets for the pension put.

In other words, his analysis is

similar to our discussion in Section V.A. Pre-ERISA, rather than that in
Section V.B. Post-ERISA.

However, the implications of insurance effect on

pension policy derived by Sharpe are similar to what we discuss here.
The general properties of the value of the PBGC's claim described in
Equations (lla) - (lle) provide useful information about insurance effects
on pension policy.

If we consider only the insurance effects, the optimal

pension policy calls for a minimum funding of the pension plans.

Reducing

the value of the corporate assets by means of increasing dividend payments
to the shareholders will reduce the value of the PBGC's pension claim--an
interesting linkage between dividend and pension policies.

In addition, an

increase in the amount of corporate liabilities will decrease the value of
pension claim and result in an increase in the wealth to the shareholders.
Finally, an increase in the correlation coefficient between corporate assets
and the pension assets (that is, a decrease in the diversification among
corporate and pension assets) will also result in a wealth gain for the
shareholders.
The above results are based on the assumption of a fixed insurance premium

18.
charged by the PBGC.

If the Guaranty Corporation charges a variable insurance

premium that reflects the fair value of its contingent liabilities, then the
policy implications described above will not necessarily be applicable.

Even

under the current structure of a fixed explicit premium, the PBGC does impose
an implicit premium of monitoring corporate pension plans.

Therefore, if the

PBGC exerts its regulatory power diligently, few pension plans can obtain
abnormal gains at the expense of the Guaranty Corporation.J1/
As

in the case of tax effects on pension policy, looking at the insurance

effects on pension policy alone is not complete, and it might result in some
misleading recommendations for corporate pension managers.

After ERISA, the

decisions on plan funding, asset allocation, and benefit accrual are of great
importance to the workers, . shareholders, financial managers, creditors and
the PBGC.

These decisions are based upon the complex trade-offs among various

explicit and implicit benefits and costs within the tax and regulatory
environment. Moreover, pension plan policies have become the integral parts
of general corporate financial management decisions.

Thus, it is important

to integrate the "tax effect" and the "insurance effect" together and discuss
their joint effects on pension as well as corporate debt policies.

VII.

Implications for Pension and Debt Policies
As

we have discussed, the tax effect, in the absence of default risk and

pension insurance, calls for a maximum plan funding and a maximum holding of
bonds in pension funds.
empirical evidence.

However, full-funding policy is not consistent with

Mumy and Manson [1982] have observed a steady rise in

the average level of underfunding for the period 1973 through 1978.

In their

sample of 200 firms the average ratio of total unfunded vested benefits to
total assets had increased from 3.9 percent in 1973 steadily to 5.4 percent
in 1978.

The current tax laws do give the firms the incentive to fund their

19.
pension plans fully, since pension contributions made by employers are deductible
immedi~tely.

Then, why do we observe underfunding among firms?

Since the

insurance effect calls for a minimum funding, one can presume that the insurance
effect dominates the tax effect for some firms and they obtain benefits from
underfunding that offset the known tax advantages.
How about the portfolio allocation policy?

The "tax effect" calls for

investing the pension funds totally in bonds; while the "insurance effect"
calls for investing mainly in risky assets such as stocks.

Again, neither

one of these two extreme policies has been applied in the real world.

As

Tepper [1981] has pointed out, equities accounted for approximately 50 percent
of pension investments in 1981, and they have ranged from a low of 19 percent
in 1950 to a high of 74 percent in 1972.

It is possible that consideration

of both effects by firms have resulted in non-corner solutions.

Furthermore,

the tax effects on pension policy in the previous studies were derived based
on the assumption of perfect certainty.

In the presence of uncertainty, factors

other than the tax factor such as diversification service or inflation-hedging
could also be important in portfolio allocation decisions.
Our discussion focuses on the implications of the "tax" and the "insurance"
effects on pension policies.
policies.

Bulow

~

Other factors undoubtedly influence pension

al. [1982] have argued that a plan could remain underfunded

for long periods of time if the following two conditions were met: (1) workers
negotiated their wages and benefits as a group, and (2) workers possessed
firm-specific human capital.

Furthermore, after ERISA the pension assets and

pension liabilities are integrated into corporate assets and corporate
liabilities, the pension policies can not be carried out without checking
their possible effects on the firm's overall investment and financing decisions.
For example, underfunding decision can be made a part of the overall corporate

20.

borrowing decision.

Underfunding is equivalent to borrowing directly from

the workers and thus provides the firm with an additional source of internal
capital, that usually has a lower transaction cost and greater flexibility.
Having alternative sources of financing is especially valuable to firms in
a period of relatively tight credit in the economy such as the 1973-79
period when the Regulation Q was in effect.

VIII.

Conclusions
The passage of ERISA has significant impact on corporate pension plans.

Under ERISA, defined-benefit pension plans are required to be enrolled in
the pension benefit insurance program of the PBGC and to pay some fixed premium.
In addition, the pension plans are subject to various regulatory constraints
such as rules regulating the uses of the assets in the pension funds, rules
constraining the way the assets in the pension funds are managed, and rules
requiring audits and reports to government agencies and the plan participants.
However, the defined-benefit pension plan has remained a viable alternative
to other types of pension plans, such as defined-contribution pension plans
that are not under the regulations of ERISA.

This shows that the increased

costs of ERISA have been balanced with explicit as well as implicit benefits
such as tax advantages for employers to retain the defined-benefit pension
plans.
The management of corporate pension plans has become an important part
of the general corporate management decisions.

Efficient pension-plan

management requires a good understanding of the complex tax and regulation
environment.

We have analyzed in this paper some tax and insurance effects

from pension policies.

We have argued that, because extreme strategies on

pension policy derived in previous studies were based on a partial and

n.
incomplete analysis, they are not generally acceptable.
To analyze the differential effects of taxation and insurance on the
value of pension claims in a unified model and to examine their relative
effects on pension policy are important areas for further study.

Empirical

evidence on trends in the relative importance of pensions in the workers'
total compensation would be of special interest.

The financial impact of

ERISA on wealth transfers among security holders has important policy
implications that deserve careful study.

Finally, searching for ways to

improve the effectiveness of corporate pension insurance prograrnsunder
ERISA would be an important topic for more research.

22.
Footnotes
1.

Mumy and Manson [1982] have reported that among the three incentives
for offering the pension plans: (1) the tax incentive; (2) the productivity
incentive; and (3) the incentive to expand internal capital market, that
they had examined, the tax incentive accounts for virtually all of the
incentive to give pensions.

2.

The Revenue Act of 1942 required that a pension plan be nondiscriminatory
in terms of coverage, contributions and benefits to qualify for the taxexempt status. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 specified that the
qualified plans must satisfy four requirements: (l)The plan must be for
the exclusive benefit of the employees and/or their beneficiaries; (2)
the sole purpose of the plan must be either to give the employees a share
of the employer's profits or to provide them with retirement income; (3)
the plan must be a permanent one, made in writing and communicated to the
employees; (4) the plan must not discriminate in favor of corporate officers,
stockholders, or highly compensated employees.

3.

Logue [1979] has argued that pensions and IRAs are equivalent in providing
tax shelter, therefore, the productivity incentive is the major factor for
giving pensions.

4.

A detailed discussion of the important provisions of ERISA can be found
in Treynor~ al.[l976].

S.

The PBGC guarantees the payment of vested pension benefits even if a plan
terminates with insufficient funds. ERISA has imposed a limit on the
amount of basic benefit insured by the PBGC, which is adjusted annually
to reflect increases in the social security wage base. The maximum amount
of basic benefit was $750 a month originally, but it was increased to
$1,381 a month by 1982.

6.

The PBGC has now specified that a company's market (rather than book) value
is the best measure of its net worth and has listed various factors that
can be used to establish a firm's fair market value. Net worth is usually
calculated as of the plan termination date, but to prevent abuse of the
insurance program, the PBGC has the right to establish the net worth record
date as many as 120 days before the actual plan termination.

7.

Johnson and Higgins, Funding Costs and Liabilities of Large Corporation
Pension Plans: 1981 Executive Report (New York: Johnson and Higgins, 1981),
pp. 4-5.

8.

See Chen and Kim [1982] for discussions of the "debt capacity" models.

9.

See Stulz [1982] and Stulz and Johnson [1983] for the application of option
pricing technique to price some complex options.

10.

Note that this result is based upon the log-normal distribution assumption.
See Stulz and Johnson [1983].

23.
11.

Some preliminary empirical results in Kang (1983] have shown that
firms with underfunded pension liabilities had experienced excessive
positive risk-adjusted returns on common stocks, while firms with
fully funded pension liabilities had experienced excessive negative
risk-adjusted returns on common stocks from the passage of ERISA.
These results seem to support the hypothesis that the "insurance effect"
had dominated the "tax effect" around the time ERISA was passed and
enacted.

12.

See Buser et al. (1981] for discussions of explicit and implicit premiums
charged by~he-FDIC on the bank deposit insurance.
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